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Vices
Are Not Crimes
A Vindication of Moral Liberty
by Lysander Spooner - 1875
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I
Vices are those acts
by which a man harms himself or his property.
Crimes are
those acts by which one man harms the person or property
of another.
Vices are simply
the errors which a man makes in his search after his own
happiness. Unlike crimes, they imply no malice toward others,
and no interference with their persons.
In vices, the very
essence of crime - that is, the design to injure the person
or property of another - is wanting.
It is a maxim of the
law that there can be no crime without a criminal intent;
that is, without the intent to invade the person or property
of another. But no one ever practises a vice with any such
criminal intent. He practices his vice for his own happiness
solely, and not from any malice toward others.
Unless this clear
distinction between vices and crimes be made and recognized
by the laws, there can be on earth no such thing as individual
right, liberty, or property, and the corresponding and coequal
rights of another man to the control of his own person and
property.
For a government to
declare a vice to be a crime, and to punish it as such,
is an attempt to falsify the very nature of things. It is
as absurd as it would be to declare truth to be falsehood,
or falsehood truth.
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II
Every voluntary act
of a man's life is either virtuous or vicious. That is to
say, it is either in accordance, or in conflict, with those
natural laws of matter and mind, on which his physical,
mental, and emotional health and well-being depend. In other
words, every act of his life tends, on the whole, either
to his happiness, or to his unhappiness. No single act in
his whole existence is indifferent.
Furthermore, each
human being differs in his physical, mental, and emotional
constitution, and also in the circumstances by which he
is surrounded, from every other human being. Many acts,
therefore, that are virtuous, and tend to happiness, in
the case of one person, are vicious, and tend to unhappiness,
in the case of another person.
Many acts, also, that
are virtuous, and tend to happiness, in the case of one
man, at one time, and under one set of circumstances, are
vicious, and tend to unhappiness, in the case of the same
man, at another time, and under other circumstances.
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III
To know what actions
are virtuous, and what vicious - in other words, to know
what actions tend, on the whole, to happiness, and what
to unhappiness - in the case of each and every man, in each
and all the conditions in which they may severally be placed,
is the profoundest and most complex study to which the greatest
human mind ever has been, or ever can be, directed. It is,
nevertheless, the constant study to which each and every
man - the humblest in intellect as well as the greatest
- is necessarily driven by the desires and necessities
of his own existence. It is also the study in which each
and every person, from his cradle to his grave, must necessarily
form his own conclusions; because no one else knows or feels,
or can know or feel, as he knows and feels, the desires
and necessities, the hopes, and fears, and impulses of his
own nature, or the pressure of his own circumstances.
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IV
It is not often possible
to say of those acts that are called vices, that they really
are vices, except in degree. That is, it is difficult to
say of any actions, or courses of action, that are called
vices, that they really would have been vices, if they
had stopped short of a certain point. The question of
virtue or vice, therefore, in all such cases, is a question
of quantity and degree, and not of the intrinsic character
of any single act, by itself. This fact adds to the difficulty,
not to say the impossibility, of any one's - except each
individual for himself - drawing any accurate line, or anything
like any accurate line, between virtue and vice; that is,
of telling where virtue ends, and vice begins. And this
is another reason why this whole question of virtue and
vice should be left for each person to settle for himself.
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V
Vices are usually
pleasurable, at least for the time being, and often do not
disclose themselves as vices, by their effects, until after
they have been practised for many years; perhaps for a lifetime.
To many, perhaps most, of those who practise them, they
do not disclose themselves as vices at all during life.
Virtues, on the other hand, often appear so harsh and rugged,
they require the sacrifice of so much present happiness,
at least, and the results, which alone prove them to be
virtues, are often so distant and obscure, in fact, so absolutely
invisible to the minds of many, especially of the young
that, from the very nature of things, there can be no universal,
or even general, knowledge that they are virtues. In truth,
the studies of profound philosophers have been expended
- if not wholly in vain, certainly with very small results
- in efforts to draw the lines between the virtues and the
vices.
If, then, it became
so difficult, so nearly impossible, in most cases, to determine
what is, and what is not, vice; and especially if it be
so difficult, in nearly all cases, to determine where virtue
ends, and vice begins; and if these questions, which no
one can really and truly determine for anybody but himself,
are not to be left free and open fro experiment by all,
each person is deprived of the highest of all his rights
as a human being, to wit: his right to inquire, investigate,
reason, try experiments, judge, and ascertain for himself,
what is, to him, virtue, and what is, to him,
vice; in other words: what, on the whole, conduces to his
happiness, and what, on the whole, tends to his unhappiness.
If this great right is not to be left free and open to all,
then each man's whole right, as a reasoning human being,
to "liberty and the pursuit of happiness," is denied him.
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VI
We all come into the
world in ignorance of ourselves, and of everything around
us. By a fundamental law of our natures we are all constantly
impelled by the desire of happiness, and the fear of pain.
But we have everything to learn, as to what will give us
happiness, and save us from pain. No two of us are wholly
alike, either physically, mentally, or emotionally; or,
consequently, in our physical, mental, or emotional requirements
for the acquisition of happiness, and the avoidance of unhappiness.
No one of us, therefore can learn this indispensable lesson
of happiness and unhappiness, of virtue and vice, for another.
Each must learn it for himself. To learn it, he must be
at liberty to try all experiments that comment themselves
to his judgement. Some of his experiments succeed, and,
because they succeed, are called virtues; others fail, and,
because they fail, are called vices. He gathers wisdom as
much from his failures as from his successes; from his so-called
vices, as from his so-called virtues. Both are necessary
to his acquisition of that knowledge - of his own nature,
and of the world around him, and of their adaptations or
non-adaptations to each other - which shall show him how
happiness is acquired, and pain avoided. And, unless he
can be permitted to try these experiments to his own satisfaction,
he is restrained from the acquisition of knowledge, and,
consequently, from pursuing the great purpose and duty of
his life.
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VII
A man is under no
obligation to take anybody's word, or yield to anybody's
authority, on a matter so vital to himself, and in regard
to which no one else has, or can have, any such interest
as he. He cannot, if he would, safely rely upon the
opinions of other men, because he finds that the opinions
of other men do not agree. Certain actions, or courses of
action, have been practised by many millions of men, through
successive generations, and have been held by them to be,
on the whole, conducive to happiness, and therefore virtuous.
Other men, in other ages or counties, or under other conditions,
have held, as the result of their experience and observation,
that these actions tended, on the whole, to unhappiness,
and were therefore vicious. The question of virtue or vice,
as already remarked in a previous section, has also been,
in most minds, a question of degree; that is, of the extent
to which certain actions should be carried; and not of the
intrinsic character of any single act, by itself. The questions
of virtue and vice have therefore been as various, and,
in fact, as infinite, as the varieties of mind body, and
condition of the different individuals inhabiting the globe.
And the experience of ages has left an infinite number of
these questions unsettled. In fact, it can scarcely be said
to have settled any of them.
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VIII
In the midst of this
endless variety of opinion, what man, or what body of men,
has the right to say, in regard to any particular action,
or course of action, "we have tried this experiment,
and determined every question involved in it? We
have determined it, not only for ourselves, but for all
others? And, as to all those who are weaker than we, we
will coerce them to act in obedience to our conclusions?
We will suffer no further experiment or inquiry by
any one, and, consequently, no further acquisition of knowledge
by anybody?"
Who are the men who
have the right to say this? Certainly there are none such.
The men who really do say it are either shameless impostors
and tyrants, who would stop the progress of knowledge,
and usurp absolute control over the minds and bodies of
their fellow men; and are therefore to be resisted instantly,
and to the last extent; or they are themselves too ignorant
of their own weaknesses, and of their true relations to
other men, to be entitled to any other consideration then
sheer pity or contempt.
We know, however,
that there are such men as these in the world. Some of them
attempt to exercise their power only within a small sphere,
to wit, upon their children, their neighbors, their townsmen,
and their countrymen. Others attempt to exercise it on a
larger scale. For example, an old man at Rome, aided by
a few subordinates, attempts to decide all questions of
virtue and vice; that is, of truth or falsehood, especially
in matters of religion. He claims to know and teach what
religious ideas and practices are conducive, or fatal, to
a man's happiness, not only in this world, but in that which
is to come. He claims to be miraculously inspired for the
performance of this work; thus virtually acknowledging,
like a sensible man, that nothing short of miraculous inspiration
would qualify him for it. This miraculous inspiration, however,
has been ineffectual to enable him to settle more than a
very few questions. The most important to which common mortals
can attain, is an implicit belief in his (the pope's)
infallibility! and, secondly, that the blackest vices
of which they can be guilty are to believe and declare that
he is only a man like the rest of them!
It required some fifteen
or eighteen hundred years to enable him to reach definite
conclusions on these two vital points. Yet it would seem
that the first of these must necessarily be preliminary
to his settlement of any other questions; because, until
his own infallibility is determined, he can authoritatively
decide nothing else. He has, however, heretofore attempted
or pretended to settle a few others. And he may, perhaps,
attempt or pretend to settle a few more in the future, if
he shall continue to find anybody to listen to him. But
his success, thus far, certainly does not encourage the
belief that he will be able to settle all questions of virtue
and vice, even in his peculiar department of religion, in
time to meet the necessities of mankind. He, or his successors,
will undoubtedly be compelled, at no distant day, to acknowledge
that he has undertaken a task to which all his miraculous
inspiration was inadequate; and that, of necessity, each
human being must be left to settle all questions of this
kind for himself. And it is not unreasonable to expect that
all other popes, in other and lesser spheres, will some
time have cause to come to the same conclusion. No one,
certainly, not claiming supernatural inspiration, should
undertake a task to which obviously nothing less than such
inspiration is adequate. And, clearly, no one should surrender
his own judgement to the teachings of others, unless he
be first convinced that these others have something more
than ordinary human knowledge on this subject.
If those persons,
who fancy themselves gifted with both the power and the
right to define and punish other men's vices, would but
turn their thoughts inwardly, they would probably find that
they have a great work to do at home; and that, when that
shall have been completed, they will be little disposed
to do more towards correcting the vices of others, than
simply to give to others the results of their experience
and observation. In this sphere their labors may possibly
be useful; but, in the sphere of infallibility and coercion,
they will probably, for well-known reasons, meet with even
less success in the future than such men have met with in
the past.
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IX
It is now obvious,
from the reasons already given, that government would be
utterly impracticable, if it were to take cognizance of
vices, and punish them as crimes. Every human being has
his or her vices. Nearly all men have a great many. And
they are of all kinds; physiological, mental, emotional;
religious, social, commercial, industrial, economical, etc.,
etc. If government is to take cognizance of any of these
vices, and punish them as crimes, then, to be consistent,
it must take cognizance of all, and punish all impartially.
The consequence would be, that everybody would be in prison
for his of her vices. There would be no one left outside
to lock the doors upon those within. In fact, courts enough
could not be found to try the offenders, nor prisons enough
built to hold them. All human industry in the acquisition
of knowledge, and even in acquiring the means of subsistence,
would be arrested: for we should all be under constant trial
or imprisonment for our vices. But even if it were possible
to imprison all the vicious, our knowledge of human nature
tells us that, as a general rule, they would be far more
vicious in prison than they ever have been out of it.
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X
A government that
shall punish all vices impartially is so obviously an impossibility,
that nobody was ever found, or ever will be found, foolish
enough to propose it. The most that any one proposes is,
that government shall punish some one, or at most a few,
of what he esteems the grossest of them. But this discrimination
is an utterly absurd, illogical, and tyrannical one. What
right has any body of men to say, "The vices of other men
we will punish; but our own vices nobody shall punish?
We will restrain other men from seeking their own
happiness, according to their own notions of it; but nobody
shall restrain us from seeking our own happiness,
according to our own notions of it? We will restrain
other men from acquiring any experimental knowledge of what
is conducive or necessary to their own happiness; but nobody
shall restrain us from acquiring an experimental
knowledge of what is conducive or necessary to our own happiness?"
Nobody but knaves
or blockheads ever thinks of making such absurd assumptions
as these. And yet, evidently, it is only upon such assumptions
that anybody can claim the right to punish the vices of
others, and at the same time claim exemption from punishment
for his own.
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XI
Such a thing as a
government, formed by voluntary association, would never
have been thought of, if the object proposed had been the
punishment of all vices, impartially; because nobody wants
such an institution, or would voluntarily submit to it.
But a government, formed by voluntary association, for the
punishment of all crimes, is a reasonable matter;
because everybody wants protection for himself against all
crimes by others, adn also acknowledges the justice of his
own punishment, if he commits a crime.
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XII
It is a natural impossibility
that a government should have a right to punish men for
their vices; because it is impossible that a government
should have any rights, except such as the individuals composing
it had previously had, as individuals. They could
not delegate to a government any rights which they did not
themselves possess. They could not contribute to
the government any rights, except such as they themselves
possessed as individuals. Now, nobody but a fool or an impostor
pretends that he, as an individual, has a right to punish
other men for their vices. But anybody and everybody have
a natural right, as individuals, to punish other
men for their crimes; for everybody has a natural right
not only to defend his own person and property against aggressors,
but also to go to the assistance and defence of everybody
else, whose person or property is invaded. The natural right
of each individual to defend his own person and property
against an aggressor, and to go to the assistance and defence
of every one else whose person or property is invaded, is
a right without which men could not exist on the earth.
And government has no rightful existence, except in so far
as it embodies, and is limited by, this natural right of
individuals. But the idea that each man has a natural right
to decide what are virtues, and what are vices - that is,
what contributes to that neighbor's happiness, and what
do not - and to punish him for all that do not contribute
to is; is what no on e ever had the impudence or folly to
assert. It is only those who claim that government has some
rightful power, which no individual or individuals ever
did, or ever could, delegate to it, that claim that
government has any rightful power to punish vices.
It will do for a pope
or a king - who claims to have received direct authority
from Heaven, to rule over his fellowmen - to claim the right,
as the viceregent of God, to punish men for their vices;
but it is a sheer and utter absurdity for any government,
claiming to derive its power wholly from the grant of the
governed, to claim any such power; because everybody knows
that the governed never would grant it. For them to grant
it would be an absurdity, because it would be granting away
their own right to seek their own happiness; since to grant
away their right to judge of what will be for their happiness,
is to grant away all their right to pursue their own happiness.
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XIII
We can now see how
simple, easy, and reasonable a matter is a government for
the punishment of crimes, as compared with one for
the punishment of vices. Crimes are few, and
easily distinguished from all other acts; and mankind are
generally agreed as to what acts are crimes. Whereas vices
are innumerable; and no two persons are agreed, except in
comparatively few cases, as to what are vices. Furthermore,
everybody wishes to be protected, in his person and
property, against the aggressions of other men. But nobody
wishes to be protected, either in his person or property,
against himself; because it is contrary to the fundamental
laws of human nature itself, that any one should wish to
harm himself. He only wishes to promote his own happiness,
and to be his own judge as to what will promote, and does
promote, his own happiness. This is what every one wants,
and has a right to, as a human being. And though we all
make many mistakes, and necessarily must make them, from
the imperfection of our knowledge, yet these mistakes are
no argument against the right; because they all tend to
give us the very knowledge we need, and are in pursuit of,
and can get in no other way.
The object aimed at
in the punishment of crimes, therefore, is not only
wholly different from, but it is directly opposed to, that
aimed at in the punishment of vices.
The object aimed at
in the punishment of crimes is to secure, to each
and every man alike, the fullest liberty he possibly can
have - consistently with the equal rights of others - to
pursue his own happiness, under the guidance of his own
judgement, and by the use of his own property. On the other
hand, the object aimed at in the punishment of vices,
is to deprive every man of his natural right and
liberty to pursue his own happiness, under the guidance
of his own judgement, and by the use of his own property.
These two objects,
then, are directly opposed to each other. They are as directly
opposed to each other as are light and darkness, or as truth
and falsehood, or as liberty and slavery. They are utterly
incompatible with each other; and to suppose the two to
be embraced in one and the same government, is an absurdity,
an impossibility. It is to suppose the objects or a government
to be to commit crimes, and to prevent crimes; to destroy
individual liberty, and to secure individual liberty.
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XIV
Finally, on this point
of individual liberty: Every man must necessarily judge
and determine for himself as to what is conducive and necessary
to, and what is destructive of, his own well-being; because,
if he omits to perform this task for himself, nobody else
can perform it for him. And nobody else will even attempt
to perform it for him, except in very few cases. Popes,
and priests, and kings will assume to perform it for him,
in certain cases, if permitted to do so. But they will,
in general, perform it only in so far as they can minister
to their own vices and crimes, by doing it. They will, in
general, perform it only in so far as they can make him
their fool and their slave. Parents, with better motives,
no doubt, than the others, too often attempt the same work.
But in so far as they practise coercion, or restrain a child
from anything not really and seriously dangerous to himself,
they do him a harm, rather than a good. It is a law of Nature
that to get knowledge, and to incorporate that knowledge
into his own being, each individual must get it for himself.
Nobody, not even his parents, can tell him the nature of
fire, so that he will really know it. He must himself experiment
with it, and be burnt by it, before he can know it.
Nature knows, a thousand
times better than any parent, what she designs each individual
for, what knowledge he requires, and how he must get it.
She knows that her own processes for communicating that
knowledge are not only the best, but the only ones that
can be effectual.
The attempts of parents
to make their children virtuous are generally little else
than attempts to keep them in ignorance of vice. They are
little else than attempts to tach their children to know
and prefer truth, by keeping them in ignorance of falsehood.
They are little else than attempts to make them seek and
appreciate health, by keeping them in ignorance of disease,
and of everything that will cause disease. They are little
else than attempts to make their children love the light,
by keeping them in ignorance of darkness. In short, they
are little else than attempts to make their children happy,
by keeping them in ignorance of everything that causes them
unhappiness.
In so far as parents
can really aid their children in the latter's search after
happiness, by simply giving them the results of their (the
parents') own reason and experience, it is all very well,
and is a natural and appropriate duty. But to practise coercion
in matters of which the children are reasonably competent
to judge for themselves, is only an attempt to keep them
in ignorance. And this is as much a tyranny, and as much
a violation of the children's right to acquire knowledge
for themselves, and such knowledge as they desire, as is
the same coercion when practised upon older persons. Such
coercion, practised upon children, is a denial of their
right to develop the faculties that Nature has given them,
and to be what Nature designs them to be. It is a denial
of their right to themselves, and to the use of their own
powers. It is a denial of their right to acquire the most
valuable of all knowledge, to wit, the knowledge that Nature,
the great teacher, stands ready to impart to them.
The results of such
coercion are not to make the children wise or virtuous,
but to make them ignorant, and consequently weak and vicious;
and to perpetuate through them, from age to age, the ignorance,
the superstitions, the vices, and the crimes of the parents.
This is proved by every page of the world's history.
Those who hold opinions
opposite to these, are those whose false and vicious theologies,
or whose own vicious general ideas, have taught them that
the human race are naturally given to evil, rather than
good; to the false, rather than the true; that mankind do
not naturally turn their eyes to the light; that they love
darkness, rather than light; and that they find their happiness
only in those things that tend to their misery.
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XV
But these men, who
claim that government shall use its power to prevent vice,
will say, or are in the habit of saying, "We acknowledge
the right of an individual to seek his own happiness in
his own way, and consequently to be as vicious as he pleases;
we only claim that government shall prohibit teh sale
to him of those articles by which he ministers to his vice."
The answer to this
is, that the simple sale of any article whatever - independently
of the use that is to be made of the article - is legally
a perfectly innocent act. The quality of the act of sale
depends wholly upon the quality of the use for which the
thing is sold. If the use of anything is virtuous and lawful,
then the sale of it, for that use, is virtuous and
lawful. If the use is vicious, then the sale of it, for
that use, is vicious. If the use is criminal, then the
sale of it, for that use, is criminal. The seller
is, at most, only an accomplice in the use that is to be
made of the article sold, whether the use be virtuous, vicious,
or criminal. Where the use is criminal, the seller is an
accomplice in the crime, and punishable as such. But where
the use is only vicious, the seller is only an accomplice
in the vice, and is not punishable.
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XVI
But it will be asked,
"Is there no right, on the part of government, to arrest
the progress of those who are bent on self-destruction?"
The answer is, that
government has no rights whatever in the matter, so long
as these so-called vicious persons remain sane, compos
mentis, capable of exercising reasonable discretion
and self-control; because, so long as they do remain sane,
they must be allowed to judge and decide for themselves
whether their so-called vices really are vices; whether
they really are leading them to destruction; and whether,
on the whole, they will go there or not. When they shall
become insane, non compos mentis, incapable of reasonable
discretion or self-control, their friends or neighbors,
or the government, must take care of them, and protect them
from harm, and against all persons who would do them harm,
in the same way as if their insanity had come upon them
from any other cause than their supposed vices.
But because a man
is supposed, by his neighbors, to be on the way to self-destruction,
from his vices, it does not, therefore, follow that he is
insane, non compos mentis, incapable of reasonable
discretion and self-control, within the legal meaning of
those terms. Men and women may be addicted to very gross
vices, and to a great many of them - such as gluttony, drunkenness,
prostitution, gambling, prize-fighting, tobacco-chewing,
smoking, and snuffing, opium-eating, corset-wearing, idleness,
waste of property, avarice, hypocrisy, etc., etc. - and
still be sane, compos mentis, capable of reasonable
discretion and self-control, within the meaning of the law.
And so long as they are sane, they must be permitted to
control themselves and their property, and to be their own
judges as to where their vices will finally lead them. It
may be hoped by the lookers-on, in each individual case,
that the vicious person will see the end to which he is
tending, and be induced to turn back. But, if he chooses
to go on to what other men call destruction, he must be
permitted to do so. And all that can be said of him, so
far as this life is concerned, is, that he made a great
mistake in his search after happiness, and that others will
do well to take warning by his fate. As to what may be his
condition in another life, that is a theological question
with which the law, in this world, has no more to do than
it has with any other theological question, touching men's
condition in a future life.
If it be asked how
the question of a vicious man's sanity or insanity is to
be determined? The answer is, that it is to be determined
by the same kinds of evidence as is the sanity or insanity
of those who are called virtuous; and not otherwise. That
is, by the same kinds of evidence by which the legal tribunals
determine whether a man should be sent to an asylum for
lunatics, or whether he is competent to make a will, or
otherwise dispose of his property. Any doubt must weigh
in favor of his sanity, as in all other cases, and not of
his insanity.
If a person really
does become insane, non compose mentis, incapable
of reasonable discretion or self-control, it is then a crime,
on the part of other men, to give to him or sell to him,
the means of self-injury. 1
There are no crimes more easily punished,
no cases in which juries would be more ready to convict,
than those where a sane person should sell or give to an
insane one any article with which the latter was likely
to injure himself.
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XVII
But it will be said
that some men are made, by their vices, dangerous to other
persons; that a drunkard, for example, is sometimes quarrelsome
and dangerous toward his family or others. And it will be
asked, "has the law nothing to do in such a case?"
The answer is, that
if, either from drunkenness or any other cause, a man be
really dangerous, either to his family or to other persons,
not only himself may be rightfully restrained, so far as
the safety of other persons requires, but all other persons
- who know or have reasonable grounds to believe him dangerous
- may also be restrained from selling or giving to him anything
that they have reason to suppose will make him dangerous.
But because one man
becomes quarrelsome and dangerous after drinking spirituous
liquors, and because it is a crime to give or sell liquor
to such a man, it does not follow at all that it is a crime
to sell liquors to the hundreds and thousands of other persons,
who are not made quarrelsome or dangerous by drinking them.
Before a man can be convicted of crime in selling liquor
to a dangerous man, it must be shown that the particular
man, to whom the liquor was sold, was dangerous; and also
that the seller knew, or had reasonable grounds to suppose,
that the man would be made dangerous by drinking it.
The presumption of
law is, in all cases, that the sale is innocent; and the
burden of proving it criminal, in any particular case, rests
upon the government. And that particular case must be
proved criminal, independently of all others.
Subject to these principles,
there is no difficulty convicting and punishing men for
the sale or gift of any article to a man, who is made dangerous
to others by the use of it.
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XVIII
But it is often said
that some vices are nuisances (public or private), and that
nuisances can be abated and punished.
It is true that anything
that is really and legally a nuisance (either public or
private) can be abated and punished. But it is not true
that the mere private vices of one man are, in any legal
sense, nuisances to another man, or to the public.
No act of one person
can be a nuisance to another, unless it in some way obstructs
or interferes with that other's safe and quiet use or enjoyment
of what is rightfully his own.
Whatever obstructs
a public highway, is a nuisance, and may be abated and punished.
But a hotel where liquors are sold, a liquor store, or even
a grog-shop, so called, no more obstructs a public highway,
than does a dry goods store, a jewelry store, or a butcher's
shop.
Whatever poisons the
air, or makes it either offensive or unhealthful, is a nuisance.
But neither a hotel, nor a liquor store, nor a grog-shop
poisons the air, or makes it offensive or unhealthful to
outside persons.
Whatever obstructs
the light, to which a man is legally entitled, is a nuisance.
But neither a hotel, nor a liquor store, nor a grog-shop,
obstructs anybody's light, except in cases where a church,
a school-house, or a dwelling house would have equally obstructed
it. On this ground, therefore, the former are no more, and
no less, nuisances than the latter would be.
Some persons are in
the habit of saying that a liquorshop is dangerous, in the
same way that gunpowder is dangerous. But there is no analogy
between the two cases. Gunpowder is liable to be exploded
by accident, and especially by such fires as often occur
in cities. For these reasons it is dangerous to persons
and property in its immediate vicinity. But liquors are
not liable to be thus exploded, and therefore are not dangerous
nuisances, in any such sense as is gunpowder in cities.
But it is said, again,
that drinking-places are frequently filled with noisy and
boisterous men, who disturb the quiet of the neighborhood,
and the sleep and rest of the neighbors.
This may be true occasionally,
though not very frequently. But whenever, in any case, it
is true, the nuisance may be abated by the punishment of
the proprietor and his customers, and if need be, by shutting
up the place. But an assembly of noisy drinkers is no more
a nuisance than is any other noisy assembly . A jolly or
hilarious drinker disturbs the quiet of a neighborhood no
more, and no less, than does a shouting religious fanatic.
An assembly of noisy drinkers is no more, and no less, a
nuisance than is an assembly of shouting religious fanatics.
Both of them are nuisances when they disturb the rest and
sleep, or quiet, or neighbors. Even a dog that is given
to barking, to the disturbance of the sleep or quiet of
the neighborhood, is a nuisance.
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XIX
But it is said, that
for one person to entice another into a vice, is a crime.
This is preposterous.
If any particular act is simply a vice, then a man who entices
another to commit it, is simply an accomplice in the vice.
He evidently commits no crime, because the accomplice
can certainly commit no greater offence than the principal.
Every person who is
sane, compos mentis, possessed of reasonable discretion
and self-control, is presumed to be mentally competent to
judge for himself of all the arguments, pro and con,
that may be addressed to him, to persuade him to do any
particular act; provided no fraud is employed to deceive
him. And if he is persuaded or induced to do the act,
his act is then his own; and even though the act prove to
be harmful to himself, he cannot complain that the persuasion
or arguments, to which he yielded his assent, were crimes
against himself.
When fraud is practised,
the case is, of course, different. If, for example, I offer
a man poison, assuring him that it is a safe and wholesome
drink, and he, on the faith of my assertion, swallows it,
my act is a crime.
Volenti non fit
injuria, is a maxim of the law. To the willing, no
injury is done. That is, no legal wrong. And
every person who is sane, compos mentis, capable
of exercising reasonable discretion in judging of the truth
or falsehood of the representations or persuasion to which
he yields his assent, is "willing," in the view of the law,;
and takes upon himself the entire responsibility for his
acts, when no intentional fraud has been practised upon
him.
This principle, that
to the willing no injury is done, has no limit, except
in the case of frauds, or of persons not possessed of reasonable
discretion for judging in the particular case. If a person
possessed of reasonable discretion, and not deceived by
fraud, consents to practise the grossest vice, and thereby
brings upon himself the greatest moral, physical, or pecuniary
sufferings or losses, he cannot allege that he has been
legally wronged. To illustrate this principle, take
the case of rape. To have carnal knowledge of a woman, against
her will, is the highest crime, next to murder, that
can be committed against her. but to have carnal knowledge
of her, with her consent, is no crime; but at most,
a vice. And it is usually holden that a female child, of
no more than ten years of age, has such reasonable
discretion, that her consent, even though procured by rewards,
or promises of reward, is sufficient to convert the act,
which would otherwise be a high crime, into a simple act
of vice. 2
We
see the same principle in the case of prize-fighters. If
I but lay one of my fingers upon another man's person, against
his will, no matter how lightly, and no matter how little
practical injury is done, the act is a crime. But if two
men agree to go out and pound each other's faces
to a jelly, it is no crime, but only a vice.
Even duels have not
generally been considered crimes, because each man's life
is his own, and the parties agree that each may take
the other's life, if he can, by the use of such weapons
as are agreed upon, and in conformity with certain rules
that are also mutually assented to.
And this is a correct
view of the matter, unless it can be said (as it probably
cannot), that "anger is madness" that so far deprives men
of their reason as to make them incapable of reasonable
discretion.
Gambling is another
illustration of the principle that to the willing no injury
is done. If I take but a single cent of a man's property,
without his consent, the act is a crime. But if two
men, who are compos mentis, possessed of reasonable
discretion to judge of the nature and probable results of
their act, sit down together, and each voluntarily stakes
his money against the money of another, on the turn of a
die, and one of them loses his whole estate (however large
that may be), it is no crime, but only a vice.
It is not a crime,
even, to assist a person to commit suicide, if he be in
possession of his reason.
It is a somewhat common
idea that suicide is, of itself, conclusive evidence of
insanity. But, although it may ordinarily be very strong
evidence of insanity, it is by no means conclusive in all
cases. Many persons, in undoubted possession of their reason,
have committed suicide, to escape the shame of a public
exposure for their crimes, or to avoid some other great
calamity. Suicide, in these cases, may not have been the
highest wisdom, but it certainly was not proof of any lack
of reasonable discretion. 3
And being within teh limits of reasonable
discretion, it was no crime for other persons to aid it,
either by furnishing the instrument or otherwise. And if,
in such cases, it be no crime to aid a suicide, how absurd
to say that, it is a crime to aid him in some act that is
really pleasurable, and which a large portion of mankind
have believed to be useful?
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XX
But some persons are
in the habit of saying that the use of spirituous liquors
is the great source of crime; that "it fills our
prisons with criminals;" and that this is reason enough
for prohibiting the sale of them.
Those who say this,
if they talk seriously, talk blindly and foolishly. They
evidently mean to be understood as saying that a very large
percentage of all the crimes that are committed among men,
are committed by persons whose criminal passions are excited,
at the time, by the use of liquors, and in consequence
of the use of liquors.
This idea is utterly
preposterous.
In the first place,
the great crimes committed in the world are mostly prompted
by avarice and ambition.
The greatest of all
crimes are the wars that are carried on by governments,
to plunder, enslave, and destroy mankind.
The next greatest
crimes committed in the world are equally prompted by avarice
and ambition; and are committed, not on sudden passion,
but by men of calculation, who keep their heads cool and
clear, and who have no thought whatever of going to prison
for them. They are committed, not so much by men who violate
the laws, as by men who, either by themselves or by their
instruments, make the laws; by men who have combined
to usurp arbitrary power, and to maintain it by force and
fraud, and whose purpose in usurping and maintaining it
is by unjust and unequal legislation, to secure to themselves
such advantages and monopolies as will enable them to control
and extort the labor and properties of other men, and thus
impoverish them, in order to minister to their own wealth
and aggrandizement. 4
The robberies and wrongs thus committed
by these men, in conformity with the laws, - that
is, their own laws - are as mountains to molehills,
compared with the crimes committed by all other criminals,
in violation of the laws.
But, thirdly, there
are vast numbers of frauds, of various kinds, committed
in the transactions of trade, whose perpetrators, by their
coolness and sagacity, evade the operation of the laws.
And it is only their cool and clear heads that enable them
to do it. Men under the excitement of intoxicating drinks
are little disposed, and utterly unequal, to the successful
practice of these frauds. They are the most incautious,
the least successful, the least efficient, and the least
to be feared, of all the criminals with whom the laws have
to deal.
Fourthly. The professed
burglars, robbers, thieves, forgers, counterfeiters, and
swindlers, who prey upon society, are anything but reckless
drinkers. Their business is of too dangerous a character
to admit of such risks as they would thus incur.
Fifthly. The crimes
that can be said to be committed under the influence of
intoxicating drinks are mostly assaults and batteries, not
very numerous, and generally not very aggravated. Some other
small crimes, as petty thefts, or other small trespasses
upon property, are sometimes committed, under the influence
of drink, by feebleminded persons, not generally addicted
to crime. The persons who commit these two kinds of crime
are but few. They cannot be said to "fill our prisons";
or, if they do, we are to be congratulated that we need
so few prisons, and so small prisons, to hold them.
The State of Massachusetts,
for example, has a million and a half of people. How many
of these are now in prison for crimes - not for the
vice of intoxication, but for crimes - committed
against persons or property under the instigation of strong
drink? I doubt if there be one in ten thousand, that is,
one hundred and fifty in all; and the crimes for which these
are in prison are mostly very small ones.
And I think it will
be found that these few men are generally much more to be
pitied than punished, for the reason that it was their poverty
and misery, rather than any passion for liquor, or for crime,
that led them to drink, and thus led them to commit their
crimes under the influence of drink.
The sweeping charge
that drink "fills our prisons with criminals" is made, I
think, only by those men who know no better than to call
a drunkard a criminal; and who have no better foundation
for their charge than the shameful fact that we are such
a brutal and senseless people, that we condemn and punish
such weak and unfortunate persons as drunkards, as if they
were criminals.
The legislators who
authorize, and the judges who practise, such atrocities
as these, are intrinsically criminals; unless their ignorance
be such - as it probably is not - as to excuse them. And,
if they were themselves to be punished as criminals, there
would be more reason in our conduct.
A police judge in
Boston once told me that he was in the habit of disposing
of drunkards (by sending them to prison for thirty days
- I think that was the stereotyped sentence) at the rate
of one in three minutes!, and sometimes more rapidly
even than that; thus condemning them as criminals, and sending
them to prison, without mercy, and without inquiry into
circumstances, for an infirmity that entitled them to compassion
and protection, instead of punishment. The real criminals
in these cases were not the men who went to prison, but
the judge, and the men behind him, who sent them there.
I recommend to those
persons, who are so distressed lest the prisons of Massachusetts
be filled with criminals, that they employ some portion,
at least, of their philanthropy in preventing our prisons
being filled with persons who are not criminals.
I do not remember to have heard that their sympathies have
ever been very actively exercised in that direction. On
the contrary, they seem to have such a passion for punishing
criminals, that they care not to inquire particularly whether
a candidate for punishment really be a criminal. Such a
passion, let me assure them, is a much more dangerous one,
and one entitled to far less charity, both morally and legally,
than the passion for strong drink.
It seems to be much
more consonant with the merciless character of these men
to send an unfortunate man to prison for drunkenness, and
thus crush, and degrade, and dishearten him, and ruin him
for life, than it does for them to lift him out of the poverty
and misery that caused him to become a drunkard.
It is only those persons
who have either little capacity, or little disposition,
to enlighten, encourage, or aid mankind, that are possessed
of this violent passion for governing, commanding, and punishing
them. If, instead of standing by, and giving their consent
and sanction to all the laws by which the weak man is first
plundered, oppressed, and disheartened, and then punished
as a criminal, they would turn their attention to the duty
of defending his rights and improving his condition, and
of thus strengthening him, and enabling him to stand on
his own feet, and withstand the temptations that surround
him, they would, I think, have little need to talk about
laws and prisons for either rum-sellers or rum-drinkers,
or even any other class of ordinary criminals. If, in short,
these men, who are so anxious for the suppression of crime,
would suspend, for a while, their calls upon the government
for aid in suppressing the crimes of individuals, and would
call upon the people for aid in suppressing the crimes of
the government, they would show both their sincerity and
good sense in a much stronger light than they do now. When
the laws shall all be so just and equitable as to make it
possible for all men and women to live honestly and virtuously,
and to make themselves comfortable and happy, there will
be much fewer occasions than now for charging them with
living dishonestly and viciously.
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XXI
But it will be said,
again, that the use of spirituous liquors tends to poverty,
and thus to make men paupers, and burdensome to the tax-payers;
and the this is a sufficient reason why the sale of them
should be prohibited.
There are various
answers to this argument.
1. One answer is,
that if the fact that the use of liquors tends to poverty
and pauperism, be a sufficient reason for prohibiting the
sale of them, it is equally a sufficient reason for
prohibiting the use of them; for it is the use,
and not the sale, that tends to poverty. The seller
is, at most, merely an accomplice of the drinker. And it
is a rule of law, as well as of reason, that if the principal
in any act is not punishable, the accomplice cannot be.
2. A second answer
to the argument is, that if government has the right, and
is bound, to prohibit any one act - that is not criminal
- merely because it is supposed to tend to poverty, then,
by the same rule, it has the right, and is bound, to prohibit
any and every other act - though not criminal - which,
in the opinion of the government, tends to poverty. And,
on this principle, the government would not only have the
right, but would be bound, to look unto every man's
private affairs and every persons personal expenditures,
and determine as to which of them did, and which of them
did not, tend to poverty; and to prohibit and punish all
of the former class. A man would have no right to expend
a cent of his own property, according to his own pleasure
or judgement, unless the legislature should be of the opinion
that such expenditure would not tend to poverty.
3. A third answer
to the same argument is that if a man does bring himself
to poverty, and even to beggary - either by his virtues
or his vices - the government is under no obligation
whatever to take care of him, unless it pleases to do so.
It may let him perish in the street, or depend upon private
charity, if it so pleases. It can carry out its own free
will and discretion in the matter; for it is above all legal
responsibility in such a case. It is not, necessarily,
any part of a government's duty to provide for the poor.
A government - that is, a legitimate government - is simply
a voluntary association of individuals, who unite for such
purposes, and only for such purposes, as suits them.
if taking care of the poor - whether they be virtuous or
vicious - be not one of those purposes, then the
government, as a government, has no more right, and
is no more bound, to take care of them, than has or is a
banking company, or a railroad company.
Whatever moral
claims a poor man - whether he be virtuous or vicious -
may have upon the charity of his fellow-men, he has no legal
claims upon them. He must depend wholly upon their charity,
if they so please. He cannot demand, as a legal
right, that they either feed or clothe him. and he has no
more legal or moral claims upon a government
- which is but an association of individuals - than he has
upon the same, or any other individuals, in their private
capacity.
Inasmuch, then, as
a poor man - whether virtuous or vicious - has no more or
other claims, legal or moral, upon a government, for food
or clothing, than he has upon private persons, a government
has no more right than a private person to control or prohibit
the expenditures or actions of an individual, on the ground
that they tend to bring him to poverty.
Mr. A. as an individual,
has clearly no right to prohibit any acts or expenditures
of Mr. Z, through fear that such acts or expenditures may
tend to bring him (Z) to poverty, and that he (Z) may, in
consequence, at some future unknown time, come to him (A)
in distress, and ask charity. And if A has no such right,
as an individual, to prohibit any acts or expenditures
on the part of Z, then government, which is a mere association
of individuals, can have no such right.
Certainly no man,
who is compos mentis, holds his right to the disposal
and use of his own property, by any such worthless tenure
as that which would authorize any or all of his neighbors
- whether calling themselves a government or not - to interfere,
and forbid him to make any expenditures, except such as
they might think would not tend to poverty,
and would not tend to ever bring him to them as a
supplicant for their charity.
Whether a man, who
is compos mentis, come to poverty, through his virtues
or his vices, no man, nor body of men, can have any right
to interfere with him, on the ground that their sympathy
may some time be appealed to in his behalf; because, if
it should be appealed to, they are at perfect liberty to
act their own pleasure or discretion as to complying with
his solicitations.
This right to refuse
charity to the poor - whether the latter be virtuous or
vicious - is one that governments always act upon. No government
makes any more provision for the poor than it pleases. As
a consequence, the poor are left to suffer sickness, and
even death, because neither public nor private charity comes
to their aid. How absurd, then, to say that government has
a right to control a man's use of his own property, through
fear that he may sometime come to poverty, and ask charity.
4. Still a fourth
answer to the argument is, that the great and only incentive
which each individual man has to labor, and to create wealth,
is that he may dispose of it according to his own pleasure
or discretion, and for the promotion of his own happiness,
and the happiness of those whom he loves. 5
Although
a man may often, from inexperience or want of judgement,
expend some portion of the products of his labor injudiciously,
and so as not to promote his highest welfare, yet he learns
wisdom in this, as in all other matters, by experience;
by his mistakes as well as by his successes. and this
is the only way in which he can learn wisdom. When he
becomes convinced that he has made one foolish expenditure,
he learns thereby not to make another like it. And he must
be permitted to try his own experiments, and to try them
to his won satisfaction, in this as in all other matters;
for otherwise he has no motive to labor, or to create wealth
at all.
Any man, who is a
man, would rather be a savage, and be free, creating or
procuring only such little wealth as he could control and
consume from day to day, than to be a civilized man, knowing
how to create and accumulate wealth indefinitely, and yet
not permitted to use or dispose of it, except under the
supervision, direction, and dictation of a set of meddlesome,
superserviceable fools and tyrants, who with no more knowledge
than himself, and perhaps with not half so much, should
assume to control him, on the ground that he had not the
right, or the capacity, to determine for himself as to what
he would do with the proceeds of his own labor.
5. A fifth answer
to the argument is, that if it be the duty of government
to watch over the expenditures of any one person - who is
compos mentis, and not criminal - to see what ones
tend to poverty, and what do not, and to prohibit and punish
the former, then, by the same rule, it is bound to watch
over the expenditures of all other persons, and prohibit
and punish all that, in its judgement, tend to poverty.
If such a principle
were carried out impartially, the result would be, that
all mankind would be so occupied in watching each other's
expenditures, and in testifying against, trying, and punishing
such as tended to poverty, that they would have no time
left to create wealth at all. Everybody capable of productive
labor would either be in prison, or be acting as judge,
juror, witness, or jailer. It would be impossible to create
courts enough to try, or to build prisons enough to hold,
the offenders. All productive labor would cease; and the
fools that were so intent on preventing poverty, would not
only all come to poverty, imprisonment, and starvation themselves,
but would bring everybody else to poverty, imprisonment,
and starvation.
6. If it be said that
a man may, at least, be rightfully compelled to support
his family, and, consequently, to abstain from all expenditures
that, in the opinion of the government, tend to disable
him to perform that duty, various answers might be given.
But this one is sufficient, viz.: that no man, unless a
fool or a slave, would acknowledge any family to be his,
if that acknowledgment were to be made an excuse, by the
government, for depriving him, either of his personal liberty,
or the control of his property.
When a man is allowed
his natural liberty, and the control of his property, his
family is usually, almost universally, the great paramount
object of his pride and affection; and he will, not only
voluntarily, but as his highest pleasure, employ his best
powers of mind and body, not merely to provide for them
the ordinary necessaries and comforts of life, but to lavish
upon them all the luxuries and elegancies that his labor
can procure.
A man enters into
no moral or legal obligation with his wife or children to
do anything for them, except what he can do consistently
with his own personal freedom, and his natural right to
control his own property at his own discretion.
If a government can
step in and say to a man - who is compos mentis,
and who is doing his duty to his family, as he sees his
duty, and according to his best judgement, however
imperfect that may be - We (the government) suspect
that you are not employing your labor to the best advantage
for your family; we suspect that your expenditures,
and your disposal of your property, are not so judicious
as they might be, for the interest of your family; and therefore
we (the government) will take you and your property
under our special surveillance, and prescribe to you what
you may, and may not do, with yourself and your property;
and your family shall hereafter look to us (the government),
and not to you, for support: - if a government can do this,
all a man's pride, ambition, and affection, relative to
this family, would be crushed, so far as it would be possible
for human tyranny to crush them; and he would either never
have a family (whom he would publicly acknowledge to be
his), or he would risk both his property and his life in
overthrowing such an insulting, outrageous, and insufferable
tyranny. And any woman who would wish her husband - he being
compos mentis - to submit to such an unnatural insult
and wrong, is utterly undeserving of his affection, or of
anything but his disgust and contempt. And he would probably
very soon cause her to understand that, if who chose to
rely on the government, for the support of herself and her
children, rather than on him, she must rely on the government
alone.
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XXII
Still another and
all-sufficient answer to the argument that the use of spirituous
liquors tends to poverty, is that, as a general rule,
it puts the effect before the cause. It assumes that it
is the use of the liquors that causes the poverty, instead
of its being the poverty that causes the use of the liquors.
Poverty is the natural
parent of nearly all the ignorance, vice, crime, and misery
there are in the world. 6
Why is it that so large a portion
of the laboring people of England are drunken and vicious?
Certainly not because they are by nature any worse than
other men. But it is because, their extreme and hopeless
poverty keeps them in ignorance and servitude, destroys
their courage and self-respect, subjects them to such constant
insults and wrongs, to such incessant and bitter miseries
of every king, and finally drives them to such despair,
that the short respite that drink or other vice affords
them, is, for the time being, a relief. This is the chief
cause of the drunkenness and other vices that prevail among
the laboring people of England.
If those laborers
of England, who are now drunken and vicious, had had the
same chances and surroundings in life as the more fortunate
classes have had; if they had been reared in comfortable,
and happy, and virtuous homes, instead of squalid, and wretched,
and vicious ones; if they had had opportunities to acquire
knowledge and property, and make themselves intelligent,
comfortable, happy, independent, and respected, and to secure
to themselves all the intellectual, social, and domestic
enjoyments which honest and justly rewarded industry could
enable them to secure - if they could have had all this,
instead of being born to a life of hopeless, unrewarded
toil, with a certainty of death in the workhouse, they would
have been as free from their present vices and weaknesses
as those who reproach them now are.
It is of no use to
say that drunkenness, or any other vice, only adds to their
miseries; for such is human nature - the weakness of human
nature, if you please - that men can endure but a certain
amount of misery before their hope and courage fail, and
they yield to almost anything that promises present relief
or mitigation; though at the cost of still greater misery
in the future. To preach morality or temperance to such
wretched persons, instead of relieving their sufferings,
or improving their conditions, is only insulting their wretchedness.
Will those who are
in the habit of attributing men's poverty to their vices,
instead of their vices to their poverty - as if every poor
person, or most poor persons, were specially vicious - tell
us whether all the poverty within the last year and a half
7 have
been brought so suddenly - as it were in a moment - upon
at least twenty millions of the people of the United States,
were brought upon them as a natural consequence, either
of their drunkenness, or of any other of their vices? Was
it their drunkenness, or any other of their vices, that
paralyzed, as by a stroke of lightning, all the industries
by which they lived, and which had, but a few days before,
been in such prosperous activity? Was it their vices that
turned the adult portion of those twenty millions out of
doors without employment, compelled them to consume their
little accumulations, if they had any, and then to become
beggars - beggars for work, and, failing in this, beggars
for bread? Was it their vices that, all at once, and without
warning, filled the homes of so many of them with want,
misery, sickness, and death? No. Clearly it was neither
the drunkenness, nor any other vices, of these laboring
people, that brought upon them all this ruin and wretchedness.
And if it was not, what was it?
This is the problem
that must be answered; for it is one that is repeatedly
occurring, and constantly before us, and that cannot be
put aside.
In fact, the poverty
of the great body of mankind, the world over, is the great
problem of the world. That such extreme and nearly universal
poverty exists all over the world, and has existed through
all past generations, proves that it originates in causes
which the common human nature of those who suffer from it,
has not hitherto been strong enough to overcome. But these
sufferers are, at least, beginning to see these causes,
and are becoming resolute to remove them, let it cost what
it may. And those who imagine that they have nothing to
do but to go on attributing the poverty of the poor to their
vices, and preaching to them against their vices, will ere
long wake up to find that the day for all such talk is past.
And the question will then be, not what are men's vices,
but what are their rights?
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NOTES
1.
To give an insane man a knife, or any other weapon, or thing,
by which he is likely to injure himself, is a crime. (return)
2.
The statute book of Massachusetts makes ten years
the age at which a female child is supposed to have discretion
enough to part with her virtue. But the same statute book
holds that no person, man or woman, of any age, or any degree
of wisdom or experience, has discretion enough to be trusted
to buy and drink a glass of spirits, on his or her own judgement!
What an illustration of the legislative wisdom of Massachusetts!
(return)
3.
Cato committed suicide to avoid falling into the hands of
Caesar. Who ever suspected that he was insane? Brutus did
the same. Colt committed suicide only an hour or so before
he was to be hanged. He did it to avoid bringing upon his
name and his family the disgrace of having it said that
he was hanged. This, whether a really wise act or not, was
clearly an act within reasonable discretion. Does any one
suppose that the person who furnished him with the necessary
instrument was a criminal? (return)
4.
An illustration of this fact is found in England, whose
government, for a thousand years and more, has been little
or nothing else than a band of robbers, who have conspired
to monopolize the land, and, as far as possible, all other
wealth. These conspirators, calling themselves kings, nobles,
and freeholders, have, by force and fraud, taken to themselves
all civil and military power; they keep themselves in power
solely by force and fraud, and the corrupt use of their
wealth; and they employ their power solely in robbing and
enslaving the great body of their own people, and in plundering
and enslaving other peoples. And the world has been, and
now is, full of examples substantially similar. And the
governments of our own country do not differ so widely from
others, in this respect, as some of us imagine. (return)
5.
It is to this incentive alone that we are indebted for all
the wealth that has ever been created by human labor, and
accumulated for the benefit of mankind. (return)
6.
Except those great crimes, which the few, calling themselves
governments, practise upon the many, by means of organized,
systematic extortion and tyranny. And it is only the poverty,
ignorance, and consequent weakness of the many, that enable
the combined and organized few to acquire and maintain such
arbitrary power over them. (return)
7.
That is, from September 1, 1873, to March 1, 1875. (return)
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