Prolegomenon
to a contemporary psychology of liberation
Thomas Teo |
Abstract This prolegomenon outlines a framework for a contemporary, critical-psychological theory of liberation. It is argued that recent developments in metatheory have lead to problems in both form and content for theory construction in the domain of liberation. As a viable solution to the formal problem, a non-foundational "conceptual network" is suggested. As "knots" in this quasi-systematic network, and thus as a preliminary solution to the problems of content, three critical research programs are reconstructed to deal with different, yet complementary aspects of power, and which are thus relevant for conceptualizing liberation: Klaus Holzkamp, representing traditional Marxism, and reconstructed in terms of participation in life conditions (labor); Jürgen Habermas, representing Neo-Marxism in terms of communication (interaction); and Michel Foucault, representing Post-Marxism, in terms of self-representation (aesthetics). From these reconstructions the subject's possibilities against power, essential for a psychology of liberation, are derived. Finally, it is argued that a conceptual network that strives to cope with practical problems must entail contextualization. |
The
term "liberation" has been used in a variety of contemporary discourses
and in the service of a variety of goals. It has been used in commercial
advertising for selling beauty products, by born-again Christians
to inspire a particular spiritual vision, and by armies in subjugating
(in the name of "liberation") their own people. In political contexts,
the term is used by the left as well as the right: both challenge
the status quo, but with different intentions and for the sake of
different utopias. Within the North American cultural domain, a personal,
individualized liberation is a central theme, most evidenced in popular
film. Liberation is thus portrayed as tantamount to getting rich,
which would then open the door to all possible worlds and all possible
opportunities for the individual. Historically,
all social movements have been motivated by some kind of liberation
concept, whether the movement's goal is ultimately judged to be ethically
wrong (eugenics) or morally right (equality, freedom). Among those
movements motivated by goals that are likely to be considered ethically
right, some of the most well known are the labor movement, the feminist
movement, the anti-imperialist movement (of so-called third-world
countries), the antiracist movement, and the civil rights movement.
Despite its impressive history, however, contemporary liberation in
the industrialized world finds itself in a state of crisis, as local
and particularized issues have become more dominant than global and
universal ones, and as the ideology of individualism, so pervasive
in the Western industrialized world, has allowed for mainly limited
thought-models of liberation. In
psychology, liberation is a widely unexamined but important topic,
especially in the clinical and applied contexts. Every clinical psychologist
has implicit ideas about liberation, that is, liberation from psychological
suffering, or about where a patient's or client's liberation should
ultimately lead. These implicit ideas, in turn, are explicated in
terms of therapeutic goals. For example, in psychoanalysis, an explicit
therapeutic goal is that the ego should prevail over the id (Freud,
1940), whereas in behavioral therapy, the therapeutic goal is expressed
in terms of modifying individual behaviors (cf. Thorpe & Olson,
1990). Liberation, thus, is implicitly construed as achieving individual,
personal, or intrapsychic end-states. In community psychology, liberation
in terms of individual empowerment has played an important role (cf.
Rappaport, 1981). Within
critical frameworks, whose impact on mainstream ideas of liberation
can be considered negligible, liberation (or emancipation) has been
addressed as a central topic (recently, e.g., by Fox & Prilleltensky,
1997; and Parker & Spears, 1996). Liberation in the critical psychological
discourse entails the notion that an individual's psychological suffering
is inextricably linked to their position within the societal status
quo. Thus, within such a framework, practices of liberation have been
conceived from a societal perspective. The
view taken here is that the term "liberation" is not self-evident,
but rather requires critical examination, as human beings are involved
in a myriad of daily practices that are difficult, if not impossible,
to transcend individually. But beyond these immediate practices, human
beings can and do dream of a better world. In the individualized utopias
of the western world, such dreams of liberation may entail such goals
as being able to afford a house, and thus being independent from a
landlord; choosing a successful career; landing a particular job;
achieving a satisfying marriage; successfully losing weight; or even
being able to afford cosmetic surgery. In contrast, in a third world
country, a personal utopia of liberation might include the dream of
having daily food or clean water. But a critical reflection on liberation
reveals that the issue is much broader than individualized notions
or realizations of dreams. Thus, a theory of liberation must address
such broader domains -- those in which social, economic, and political
inequalities (viz., racism, sexism, classism, imperialism) make it
necessary to think about liberation. Yet, a psychology of liberation
must emphasize the individual's possibilities in these domains --
even when goals can only be achieved in cooperation with others. Thus,
a psychological theory of liberation must do justice to both domains:
the individual as well as the societal. In
this prolegomenon, a term which refers in philosophy to the introduction,
preamble, or prologue to a larger theory or research program, I outline
a contemporary psychology of liberation that takes several levels
of liberation quasi-systematically into account. The term prolegomenon
is necessary as developments in the area of epistemology, metatheory,
and cultural studies have shown that systematic theory development
in a domain such as "liberation" is highly problematic, in both form
and content. These theoretical developments make it necessary to reconstitute
a theory of liberation from its very "foundations." In
addition, the term prolegomenon outlines a new approach in critical-theoretical
thinking, as the proposed psychology of liberation, intended as part
of a critical theory of subjectivity, underlines the conceptual-empirical
possibilities of a subject. By focusing on these conceptual-empirical
possibilities, I am aware that the suggested psychology of liberation
is very much reflective of a European, continental, critical tradition
of thinking. This tradition has produced remarkable insights; still,
I am aware that insights developed in other contexts must not be neglected.
Having a certain perspective does not exclude -- at least in the program
that I am suggesting -- perspectives that are lesser known than the
mainstream critical European approaches. As
well, I use the term "psychology" in an admittedly idiosyncratic way
when I argue that it is necessary to reflect upon the conceptual-empirical
possibilities of a subject. The term "conceptual-empirical" emphasizes
that conceptual possibilities derived through theoretical reflection
are not merely hypothetical, but can be realized and revealed through
human experience. A psychology of liberation entails reflection upon
the possibilities of a subject with regard to power structures,
a theoretical task usually neglected in mainstream psychology. The
term subjectivity refers to these psychological, namely, action possibilities,
of a subject. Thus, I will explore the contexts in which a subject
might ask him or herself in which dimensions of social reality, especially
power structures, he or she might become active; these are domains
of liberation. Due to this conceptual focus, I will not talk about
traditional psychological subjectmatters such as motivation, emotion,
or cognition that might go along with liberation. Too, I emphasize
that a focus on the subject's action possibilities does not imply
individualism, as the possibilities of the subject might be realized
through participation in a social action or larger group process (e.g.,
a worker engaging in strike actions in solidarity with other workers). As
the prolegomenon incorporates criticisms of postmodern theoretical
discourses, yet grounds its concepts within a modern tradition, it
might be labeled neo-modern. It provides an informed reconciliation
of certain modern as well as postmodern ideas. At
this point it must also be said that the nature of this article is
academic and philosophical-psychological, and thus, its application
is not immediately explicated. This may be disappointing for activists
or practitioners, but it is necessary from an intellectual point of
view. In general, my goal is to provide a framework that allows for
the conceptualization of a theory that can withstand recent challenges
to theory construction in the natural and human sciences, and which
is able to reconstruct Marxist, Neo-Marxist, and Post-Marxist theories
in such a way that they complement rather than exclude each other. CHALLENGES
TO A CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY OF LIBERATION Developments in both the philosophies of knowledge and metatheory reveal theoretical problems that are relevant for any attempt to elaborate a quasi-comprehensive contemporary psychology of liberation. The
social sciences are in an even more vulnerable position than the natural
sciences, since the human and social sciences have immunized their
ambiguous position (cf. Koch & Leary, 1985) with a seemingly rigorous
antidote -- a traditional philosophy of science. Thus, the criticisms
against the traditional philosophy of science hit the human and social
sciences that much harder than they did the natural sciences. Too,
developments within the human and social sciences have always been
accompanied by a critical discourse, which in its Marxist version
confronted the social sciences with their ideological affiliation
with the political-economic system. Too, Michel Foucault has become
the theoretical counterpart of Thomas S. Kuhn in the human sciences,
in arguing that a true discourse in the human sciences is not
possible, since any discourse is determined by an historical a
priori, and in claiming that the human sciences are understandable
solely within a given episteme (Foucault, 1970). Foucault (1977)
demonstrated the relationship between knowledge and power, and argued
that a liberation discourse, whether within a Freudian or traditional
Marxist framework, reproduces the oppressive outcome against which
it fights, as the framework is itself part of the discourse (Foucault,
1978). If
one looks carefully at the basic and specific arguments against attempts
to develop a quasi-comprehensive theory and psychology of liberation,
one may extract core issues that must be addressed in a prolegomenon.
But as soon as a psychology of liberation attempts to address elementary
topics of liberation, it is confronted with the problems of a grand,
systematic, and foundational theory. This issue refers to the formal
problem of theory development. Secondly, although not independent
from the first problem, the concept or notion of the liberation of
a subject itself has been challenged in many ways. This issue refers
to the content problem. Both issues will be discussed in some
detail below. Formal
problems for a contemporary psychology of liberation Within
the postmodern discourse (cf. Docherty, 1993; Hare-Mustin & Marecek,
1988; Kvale, 1992a; Natoli & Hutcheon, 1993; Nicholson, 1990;
Rosenau, 1992; Welsch, 1995), the idea of a grand theory, and the
possibility for a global, universal, and inclusive theory, have been
challenged systematically. Hegel's (1986) statement that "truth is
totality" (p. 24) is turned in the postmodern discourse to the idea
that totality never can do justice to the truth. Thus, in the postmodern
discourse, one refers to the demise of large projects, and to a departure
from meta-narratives, while favoring instead affirmation, multiplicity,
plurality, difference, anti-fundamentalism, and local truths (see
Welsch, 1992). Revealing
the social context that underlies postmodern thought (Harvey, 1990)
does not imply that there is no rationality in postmodern ideas. Studies
into the history of thought and practices demonstrate the relativity
of truth (regarding psychology, see Danziger, 1990). Thus, it seems
reasonable -- particularly within the social and human sciences --
that every holistic claim for an understanding of reality must fail,
due to the historicity and contextuality of claims, and to the logic
of research.
[1]
The complexity of the subject matter of the social and
human sciences and the reality of different paradigms suggest that
a universal and systematic foundation is prone to failure. The history
of philosophy shows that foundational and universal theoretical approaches
either ignored parts of a reality that were not represented in a given
system or simply assimilated such parts within the framework while
distorting and misrepresenting the specificity of an object or event. Not
surprisingly, theories of liberation are cultural, historical, and
social events. Understandable from a practical viewpoint, but unfortunate
for practices, traditional left liberation discourses maintained exactly
the idea of a grand theory, while criticizing small "reformist" attempts
at change, as well as the fragmentation of social reality. In traditional
Marxism (e.g., Autorenkollektiv, 1982) social reality was viewed under
the core concept of "capital," while other problems of domination
were interpreted as secondary contradictions of the class struggle.
Psychologies that worked within the framework of traditional Marxism,
such as German Critical Psychology (Holzkamp, 1983), maintained these
assumptions, by proposing an inclusive and systematic-hierarchical
psychological theory. Content
problems for a theory of liberation Yet,
a contemporary psychology of liberation must not only cope with formal
problems; it must also address content problems. The goals and methods
of emancipation and liberation are nowadays criticized widely as part
of the deconstruction of "enlightenment" and the idea of progress
through rationality. Especially
in the German tradition, critical approaches kept exactly to the moments
of emancipation or rational enlightenment, and to the idea that the
use of theory might allow societies (Habermas, 1971, 1988) and subjects
(Holzkamp, 1972) to emancipate from individual and societal dependencies.
Thus, it followed, science should connect theory to practice. Marx
himself argued that a theory in the hands of the masses has a huge
practical value (Marx & Engels, 1970). Interestingly,
the idea of the "Frankfurt school," that rational emancipation must
be a core concept of the social sciences, has been criticized within
the traditional "positivist" discourse (cf., Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf,
Habermas, Pilot & Popper, 1969), but also within the contemporary,
seemingly progressive, postmodern discourse (e.g., Kvale 1992b). As
a reminder, the critical-theoretical concept of emancipation was developed
in opposition to the assumption that social sciences and psychology
are empirical endeavors, which discover in a "value-free" way objects
and laws within an objective, empirical reality; which examine hypotheses
using objective methods; and which interpret results in a "neutral"
way. In the critical discourse, it has been argued that both the context
of discovery as well as the context of justification are determined
through societal relations, and thus, there are ideological influences
on theory construction and application (cf. Wiggershaus, 1994). Finally,
proponents of these developments within metatheory criticize the idea
of a subject as a center of meaning, consciousness, speech,
action, or intentionality. The traditional critical-emancipatory discourse
within psychology has emphasized the notions of subject and subjectivity
as essential but excluded concepts within mainstream social sciences.
In doing so, the critical discourse (German Critical Psychology or
Freudo-Marxism) never shared traditional assumptions of subjectivity,
but rather maintained the subject as socially, culturally, and historically
mediated. The term "subjectivity" was even used to attack mainstream
psychology as an alienating psychology, one without subjects, and
interested only in distributions and central tendencies or in irrelevant
tests of significance (Holzkamp, 1972). It was argued that such a
psychology failed to understand the ontological difference between
the objects of research in physics and in psychology (Holzkamp, 1972).
As
a psychology of liberation deals -- within a psychological
approach -- explicitly with human subjectivity, or with the subject's
possibilities, it is my view that human subjectivity is the genuine
psychological subject matter, and one which requires no further justification
in terms of its relevance. This does not mean that the nature of subjectivity,
or the subject's conceptual-empirical possibilities are already known.
This will be the topic of the following argumentation.
[2]
SUGGESTED
SOLUTION FOR THE FORMAL AND CONTENT ISSUES While
keeping to the concept of a subject, this prolegomenon must solve
the problem of a grand and systematic theory, as well as the problem
of the content of liberation. I see at least five possible ways to
deal with these problems. Let's
go back to a psychology as a natural science! In following this
slogan, issues of liberation are no longer an appropriate topic of
inquiry for a scientific psychology. One then must admit that mainstream
psychology was right after all, and that such topics cannot be dealt
with in a scientific psychology.
[3]
Psychology in this sense explores small, defined, "local"
areas, free from any emancipatory rhetoric, in which the subject itself
is of no interest. Back
to the roots! If one understands the old as being the true or
genuine, and thus would rather ignore the problems raised by post-empiricist
contemporary discourses, then one could always retreat to psychoanalysis
or phenomenology. One might well consider such a romantic longing
for the apparently proven, clear, and solid, in the thicket of diversity
of problems, as an understandable response, since psychoanalysis and
phenomenology are the most important theories and practices with regard
to concrete subjects. However, although they might include personal
perspectives of liberation, one might doubt that psychoanalysis will
be able to address the complexity of liberation, due to the non-societal
nature of its basic categories. History
of psychology: As an historian of psychology, one might
challenge research practices and psychological concepts, reveal the
social underpinnings of research, and even argue for an understanding
of the status quo as only one of many possible. In my view, however,
such a position is insufficient for a critical psychology and for
progressive theory construction. Postmodern
psychology: This approach is confronted with a series
of contradictions, as soon as the goal of criticism is gone (cf. Teo,
1996). A prominent proponent such as Gergen (1994) argues that the
postmodernism implies "sterner stuff." But this sterner stuff leads
to a "rapprochement" with the mainstream, by demanding that mainstream
psychology reduce its universal claim, become more reflexive, and
less narrow, and not fear the use of multimedia in research. The issue
of liberation, as far as I can see, is not addressed adequately.
[4]
Finally,
it seems obvious that psychology and the social sciences require a
new type of theory in the field of liberation. The one proposed here
is future-oriented, and one might call it neo-modern, as it keeps
to certain aspects of modernity. As I will describe, its aim is to
both develop a quasi-systematic theory and to uphold the goals
of emancipation, liberation, and freedom, while at the same time taking
into account justified criticisms and thus avoiding foundationality. As
the present prolegomenon outlines a theory of liberation, it
seems necessary to emphasize the importance of theory construction
for those who view liberation as essentially a practice, and not a
theory. First, I suggest that the post-empiricist discourse is correct
in arguing that research and other practices are theory-laden. Thus,
theory is needed anyway. Second, if the borders of my theory are the
borders of my world (paraphrasing Wittgenstein, 1968), then we will
need broad theories. Third, if theory provides the basis for practical
actions, then we require not only a broad theory, but a useful and
good theory. The proposed psychology of liberation intends to address
all of these problems. How
can one conceptualize or formulate a theory that transcends a rigid
systematic foundation? And how will it be possible to include contemporary
criticisms while simultaneously grounding a psychology of liberation
within modern tradition? The basic idea proposed here is to use a
"postmodern" solution for the formal problem, while at the same time
using an integration of some modern ideas to address the content problem. Formal
solution: A conceptual network A
basic error relevant to theories of liberation was the idea that there
is one concept or one theory that encompasses all relevant aspects
of liberation. Given the above arguments, it becomes evident that
a broad theory of liberation may be realized only as a conceptual
network that is able to incorporate different liberating traditions.
Nevertheless, such a conceptual network must possess certain qualities
or characteristics. To meet this requirement, it seems to me that
the best notion developed so far is the concept of a "rhizome," as
described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987). The
authors distinguish among three forms of book writing or thought in
the history of philosophy, and to describe them they use the metaphor
of a "root" (cf. Welsch, 1995). Metaphysics
can be characterized through a "root-tree" in which everything is
derived from a single source. Thus, multiplicity is differentiated
from a single unit. Descartes' (1960) "method" may be considered the
most important exemplar of such an approach; binary logic and Chomsky's
linguistic approach are mentioned as contemporary examples. However,
Deleuze and Guattari argue that this metaphysical model does not do
justice to multiplicity, as it underestimates its specificity. In
contrast, modernity may be characterized by a "fasciculated
root," a system of small roots whereby one finds many sources. Within
this conceptualization, modernity appears to take many autonomous
sources into account and plurality is acknowledged. Yet, Deleuze and
Guattari (1987) argue that while on the one hand multiplicity is considered,
on the other, a different kind of unity is established. Thus, James
Joyce breaks up the unity of the word while producing a unity of text;
Friedrich Nietzsche's aphorisms break up the unity of philosophical
knowledge while introducing the unity of eternal return. Thus Deleuze
and Guattari argue that it is insufficient to demand multiplicity
because multiplicity must be produced. As
a way out this problem, they suggest the rhizome, which I will
use as a metaphor for the proposed conceptual network of liberation.
A
rhizome is a stem organ, in which branches in the air can grow again
into the soil, where old parts die out, and where new branches are
formed elsewhere. A rhizome has many branches with many separate roots
and appears differently over time. As there is no basic or central
point, one may call it a network. The rhizome might be considered
a vivid network that allows one to bridge differences and to consider
non-parallel developments. It allows one to think in terms of dynamics
instead of statics, complexes instead of monoliths, and multiplicity
instead of unity. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), even evolution
may follow this model. Accordingly,
a conceptual network for liberation may be much like a non-foundational
rhizome, a quasi-system, where certain integral concepts might die
out over time, and new concepts formed at different knots. Thus, a
psychology of liberation, and its basic conceptual knots, might appear
differently in the course of their existence. Further, there is no
basic knot in a network, and the network may be applied differently
by different people in different contexts. The quality of the concepts
may be evaluated in terms of practical-reason (cf. Teo, 1996; Febbraro
& Chrisjohn, 1994; and Prilleltensky, 1994). Although the term
practical reason has a broader meaning, one may refer at this point
to Foucault's idea of theories as practical tools (see Lotringer,
1996), or Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) emphasis on scientific concepts
as central tools for human activities. The emphasis on concepts as
empowering instruments is derived from the idea that concepts enable
us to develop our perceptions and analyses of the world and thus can
open or lead the way to practices (cf. Haug, 1987). Content
Solution: Possibilities for the subject It
is difficult to deny the existence of exploitation, humiliation, degradation,
and injustice in the world. Psychology can either ignore or care about
these facts. If psychology chooses to care, then it would seem necessary
to develop a psychological theory of liberation, whereby the
term psychological refers to the subject's conceptual-empirical liberating
possibilities with regard to power, and whereby an emancipated subjectivity
refers to a subjectivity that is conscious about these possibilities. A network
consists of knots, and one must begin somewhere to build a conceptual
network of liberation. Taking the above characteristics into account,
these knots must nevertheless be considered a preliminary first step. From
an historical point of view, it makes sense to study those theoretical
traditions that have taken issues of liberation as their theoretical
center. A significant critical tradition and thus a "strong knot"
in this conceptual network is Marxism. Social and theoretical
changes lead to Neo-Marxism, another strong knot, as it maintains
the notion of emancipation. Other traditions that went beyond Marxism
nonetheless have their roots in Marxism, and thus I will refer to
this strong knot as Post-Marxism. These traditions are psychologically
and theoretically well-represented (see my justification below) by
the theories of Klaus Holzkamp (1927-1995), Jürgen Habermas (born
1929), and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), respectively. In this prolegomenon
I will reconstruct some of their ideas and will introduce them
into the proposed conceptual network as momentary knots. Worth
mentioning first, however, is one commonalty and one difference among
these authors, each of whom has taken subjectivity, power, liberation,
and possibilities of the subject into account.
[5]
If one looks at the biographical-historical dimension
of these authors, one realizes that for each of them Marxism played
a different role in their lives. Marxism played a role for the young
Foucault in the early 1950s when he was a member of the Communist
Party of France (cf. Eribon, 1989), for Habermas in the 1960s when
he introduced Marxist theories into his thinking (cf. McCarthy, 1978),
and for Holzkamp in the 1970s when he developed a Marxist psychology
(cf. Teo, 1993; Tolman, 1994). Yet, one might describe their relationship
to Marx in reverse sequence: Holzkamp, the latest, is Marxist, Habermas
is Neo-Marxist, and Foucault is Post-Marxist. The
idea of a conceptual network allows for different frameworks as they
offer different insights. Thus, in formulating a psychological theory
of liberation, it is not necessary to compare these approaches in
terms of their different world views. From a pragmatic point of view,
it is only relevant to compare how each of the authors might contribute
to a psychology of liberation. Comparisons, analyses of contradictions,
and analyses of categories are theoretical tasks that might be neglected
within a conceptual network. Nevertheless, it is helpful to suggest
certain reconstructions. Thus, I argue that the Marxist labor paradigm
played the central role for Holzkamp, while Habermas considered this
concept outdated and introduced the interaction paradigm. Foucault,
who focused on topics traditionally rejected and excluded in critical
research, such as body, insanity, and delinquency, will be reconstructed
in terms of an aesthetical paradigm.
[6]
A
CONCEPTUAL NETWORK FOR A PSYCHOLOGY OF LIBERATION If
one understands liberation as the subjective or psychological side
of a dialectical process, and in my view psychology's subject matter
is indeed this subjective side, it would still be misleading to think
that one can develop concepts of liberation (or empowerment, the traditional
psychological term) by focusing on only the subjective part. The subjective
side is -- to turn a dialectical event metaphorically -- only one
side of a coin in which power simultaneously reflects the other, contextual
side. Indeed, how shall one derive adequate notions of liberation,
if one does not understand the context, structure, or logic of power?
It
is my position that an adequate theory of liberation can only be realized
by referring to concepts of power. Only then will psychologists understand
the possibilities and limits of liberation. Interestingly, however,
the psychological literature on "empowerment" hardly mentions the
work on power in social philosophy. Thus, empowerment is seen primarily
as an individual competence; an ability or capacity; a form of self-control;
an individual skill; a personal growth goal; a capability to speak
in one's own voice; and so on (cf. Friedmann, 1992; Gershon &
Straub, 1989; Rappaport, 1981). Although it would be unfair to suggest
that empowerment in psychology is exclusively discussed in terms of
personal, internal, private, or subjective experiences, for psychologists
have been increasingly incorporating contextual aspects, there remains
a focus on the individual (cf. Riger, 1993), largely due to an inadequate
conceptualization of the interaction of contexts such as power and
individuals. For a theoretical slogan, it seems appropriate to paraphrase
Kant (1982): Liberation without a concept of power is ignorant. And
as a psychologist one might add: Analyses of power that do not take
into account concrete liberation are vain. If
one agrees with such a position, then it becomes obvious that one
must turn to social-philosophical concepts of power for a more adequate
conceptualization. Power has been an ongoing philosophical topic since
ancient Greek times, but most remarkable from a modern point of view
is Hegel's (1986) idea of a master-slave dialectic, one which inspired
Marx and Engels (1970) to develop their concept of class struggle
within bourgeois society (see also Althusser, 1984). Although Marx's
political-economic concept of power is limited, it remains nonetheless
a point of departure for many social philosophers, either in its further
development, or in its strict demarcation. Concepts
of power Holzkamp
(1983) draws on the classical Marxist tradition in which power is
conceptualized as the material and intellectual domination of people
over people (Marx & Engels, 1970). The emphasis is on material
domination, a domination derived from a class society in which unequal
access to the means of production rules. In terms of historical materialism,
it is argued that in slave-holding societies, power is defined as
the direct personal dependence of a slave on a slave-holder; while
in feudalist societies, power represents the dependence of a farmer
on a feudal master; and in capitalist societies, power refers to the
economic power of the class that controls the means of production,
and thus the participation in the conditions and goods of life. Holzkamp
(1983) argues from within this tradition that the majority of humans
are excluded from control over the societal process (p. 361). Power
in this sense is a supra-subjective concept, one which refers
to control over objective life conditions. Habermas
(1984, 1987a) refers to power as a disturbance in the sphere of interaction
and communication, while at the same time denouncing the traditional
Marxist interpretation of power as imprecise, due to the welfare-state
character of Western industrial countries (Habermas, 1979). Power
appears in Habermas' work as a problem of interaction; power thus
refers to purposive-rational action, which is defined as a strategic
social action coordinated through egocentric calculations of success,
and in which other people are used as means. With such a concept,
Habermas comes closest to traditional definitions of power. Power
is the antithesis to consensus- oriented, communicative action, which
is oriented towards understanding. In his theory of communicative
action (Habermas, 1984, 1987a), power is also mentioned in the context
of the colonialization of the lifeworld (i.e., the interactive sphere),
through imperatives of the system: money and power. And if power regulates
the discourse of a given community, but not communicative exchanges,
then a lifeworld will encounter severe problems. Interestingly, power
as such is not a problematic topic for Habermas, as power may have
normative legitimation, and normative legitimation is a prerequisite
for the acceptability of power. Finally, it is possible to return
to Habermas' (Habermas & Luhmann, 1971) concept of an ideal speech
situation. In this case, power is associated with a speech situation
in which only certain persons have the right to begin a discourse,
to pose questions, to provide interpretations, and to offer statements,
explanations, and justifications. Thus, Habermas' concept of power
can be reconstructed as an inter-subjective concept. The
most influential Post-Marxist concept of power has been provided by
Foucault. Foucault's (1977) power is a disciplinary power that targets
the body. Thus, one must study mechanisms of discipline in schools,
prisons, hospitals, the military, and other institutions. For example,
the architecture of a building, or the way in which rooms are organized,
leads to learning processes of the body. Power in Foucault's terms
is not "negative" as it is in traditional Marxism; rather, it engenders
a positive function (similar to Nietzsche).
[7]
Bio-power directs life via sexuality and the management
of people in a "productive" way, as it is important for the administration
of life. This productive form of power is intertwined with knowledge
and the human sciences. Important for a psychology of liberation is
Foucault's intra-subjective notion that power is constitutive
for the subject, that power constructs the self, and that the body
is a central object of power. This idea has also proven helpful for
many feminist analyses.
[8]
Liberation:
Possibilities of the subject with regard to power A
psychology of liberation takes the side of the subject into account.
Interestingly, the three central authors whose work is the focus of
this paper are not just theoreticians of power, but rather, they emphasize
the active role of the subject and its possibilities to challenge
power. Holzkamp's
(1983) elaborations are pre-structured through the concept of labor
(see also Tolman & Maiers, 1991). Thus, the subject may fight
to participate in determining life conditions; the subject has the
ability, in cooperation with others, to overcome a class society,
and thus a ruling and dominating class; and the subject has the possibility
of recognizing that his or her personal arrangement with the powerful,
a typical coping strategy within class societies, may perpetuate the
status quo. Too, the subject can overcome anxiety in understanding
its connection with societal realities. Within a general "action competence,"
the subject can work against his or her arrangement with power-laden
contexts, for example, with regard to means of production, but also
in the areas of employment, housing, and health care. Habermas'
(1984, 1987a) reflections are pre-structured through the basic category
of communication. The subject can participate in the formation of
his or her lifeworld and fight against deformations of the lifeworld
through demands of the system, for example, by intervening in the
public sphere. Taking part in social actions and movements could be
considered an activity directed against power. In all communicative
situations the subject might demand egalitarian processes of communication.
Too, the subject can examine individual or societal goals under normative
points of view, and either confirm or reject them (when its normative
legitimation is unacceptable; Habermas, 1984, p. 285). Finally, the
ideal speech situation can be turned psychologically (and thus avoid
its sociological problems) by using it as a criterion by which to
identify deformed interactions in contexts of communication and as
a tool for defining power-laden interaction situations. Foucault,
who rejected in his early works the idea of a subject (e.g., Foucault,
1970), and thus preferred to use concepts such as experience structure,
episteme, and dispositive, returned later to subjectivity in introducing
the idea of a subject who is able to install his or her life as a
piece of art. Acting against power means to define one's own life
as art. Thus, the subject has the possibility to develop an aesthetics
of existence; an individual lifestyle becomes possible in the areas
of sexuality, body, and other forms of self-expression. The subject's
resistance is conceptualized in terms of technologies of the self.
Thus Foucault is able to theorize even sado-masochistic practices
as liberating (cf., Kögler, 1994) -- an unthinkable idea for Holzkamp
or Habermas.
[9]
CONTEXT
OF LIBERATION For
example, if "I"
[10]
am confronted with racism, and "I" want to fight against
racism then "I" have to analyze "my" context, as racism has a different
meaning in Europe, in the United States, or in former South Africa
(as well, its meaning may differ within Europe, depending on the legal,
political, historical, and economic specificity of a given country).
The
conceptual network suggests to "me" that "I" relate "my" actions to
the dimension of labor and ask "myself" about concrete action possibilities
in this dimension. Thus, "I" consider labor one dimension in which
"I" may become politically active. "I" might want to fight racism
in labor-related domains such as concrete working conditions, housing,
health care, welfare, and so on. "I" might organize or take part in
an action that objects to salary inequities for different ethnic groups,
or even more radically, challenge the fact that the means of production
do not belong to all people (issues that are usually discussed within
Marxism). Yet,
the conceptual network, as proposed, suggests not only to think about
labor, but also to reflect upon liberation in the dimension of interaction.
"I" might find that an important part of a fight against racism is
deconstructing the symbolic and communicative representations of those
people oppressed by racism. "I" might expose and criticize racism
in school books, talk about the difference and similarity between
traditional and symbolic racism, racism in the mass media, and so
on (cf. Teo, 1995b). "I" have the concrete possibility to challenge
someone who is making a racist remark. And
finally, the conceptual network suggests, with regard to liberation
in the dimension of aesthetics, that "I" think about or learn to define
"myself" as a person worthy of self-expression; to take pride in "myself"
as an ethnic minority person and in "my" physical appearance; to reach
for a personal lifestyle and self-definition beyond the constructions
of a racist discourse; and to appropriate aesthetical judgments in
the service of "myself" ("I am a person of color and I am proud of
it, and there is nothing wrong with my nose"). The
three knots of the conceptual network (Marxism, Neo-Marxism, Post-Marxism;
or Holzkamp, Habermas, Foucault; or labor, interaction, aesthetics)
are an heuristic guideline, a scaffolding, that suggest in which dimensions
"I" might wish to think about power and liberation. The conceptual
network (rhizome metaphor) also suggests to focus not only on one
dimension of power or liberation; it demonstrates that it may be adapted
and changed totally according to different social-historical contexts,
as power and liberation may have new meanings in new contexts. The
openness of the conceptual network becomes necessary when one realizes
that means and goals of liberation in Western countries may be different
from those in developing countries (the term "may" is used because
it might turn out that power structures in inner-city areas in the
US are very similar to those in developing countries), especially
since liberation practices in advanced capitalist countries have focused
in recent years more on the dimension of interaction and aesthetics,
and to a lesser extent on the dimension of labor. This includes the
fact Continental-European authors as incorporated in the network,
with their strengths in addressing problems of power and liberation
from a philosophical perspective and involved in specific Western
issues of liberation, require the experiences and reflections of people
who have been involved in other (maybe more basic) practices of liberation.
A conceptual network is open for the works of Freire (1985), Hooks
(1990), or Martin-Baro (1994), and is open to the ideas of activists
who have had no academic voice. Liberation is much too complex a field
to allow itself to exclude the experiences of people concerned. The
proposed conceptual network for a psychology of liberation allows
the support of subjects in the enlightenment of societal and individual
dependencies and possibilities -- a traditional critical-theoretical
goal. To avoid its foundational fallacies, a conceptual network has
been proposed that, by definition, is mutable, and that entails its
own suspension as soon as the knots are of no value to people oppressed
by power. Still,
at this juncture, it is important to emphasize the position that power
or liberation cannot be sufficiently analyzed in social constructionist
terms. A focus on written and spoken "texts" is important but leads
to deficits in understanding the complexity of power, domination,
and liberation. Power is an objective social reality. Thus,
psychology must include "structural-societal" concepts in its theories
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[1] Postmodernists did not originate the idea
of the relativity of truth. Already Lenin (1962) -- usually considered
a representative of a "simple" correspondence theory of truth
-- had argued about the historical relativity of knowledge. The
difference is that Lenin believed that science would approximate
truth over time, without ever reaching absolute truth.
[2] The emphasis on theoretical aspects for
understanding the decline of the concept of liberation is due
to the course of the present argumentation. Certainly, however,
one would need to take so-called external aspects into account
for an understanding of the "loss of liberation."
[3] Also worth noting is Foucault's positive
evaluation of the natural sciences in comparison to the human
sciences (see Rouse, 1987).
[4] I know that I am not doing total justice
to K. Gergen given his enormous theoretical output. Still, I am
amazed about his abstemious statements in the "American Psychologist."
[5] I am ignoring in this context the reconstruction
of different developments in these authors' scientific biographies
as well as the theoretical changes these authors made (for details
see Teo, 1993, 1995).
[6] Derrida (1993) might also be considered
a Post-Marxist contributor, but he does not provide psychological
insights as Foucault does (see Kamuf, 1991).
[7] Comparative analyses of power as conceptualized
by Foucault and Habermas have been provided by McCarthy (1991),
Honneth (1986), and by Habermas (1987b) himself. A comparative
analysis of Habermas and Holzkamp has been performed by Teo (1995a).
[8] Foucault's theory entails much more sophistication
than I have been able to sketch here. In addition, his theory
of power went through many different stages (cf. Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982). The notion of power as the compulsion to confession
(Foucault, 1986), for example, is not be included here.
[9] The idea that resistance can be turned aesthetically
is also evident in Peter Weiss' (1975) novel.
[10] The "I" form is used to convey that the conceptual
network can be used as a very concrete tool. |